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Abstract 
The institutional ownership has been one of the 
most important elements of capital markets world-
wide so that most of these investments are done by 
this organization. This research investigated the ef-
fect of institutional ownership on the conservative 
elements in Tehran Stock Exchange. The Hypoth-
eses of this research were developed by using the 
conservative theories of Basu (e.g. Basu , 1997) and 
the models presented by Lara et al (e.g. Lara et al., 
2007). Using the data of financial statements and 
stock prices of 115 companies approved in Tehran 
Stock Exchange during 2008 to 2013 and multivar-
iate linear regression analysis, the results showed 
that the institutional ownership of companies does 
not affect the conservative elements. 
Keywords: Institutional Ownership, Conserva-
tism, Corporate size, Operational Accruals, Non-
operational  Accruals
Introduction
With regard to the economic aspects of the 
data, the financial reporting and the accounting 
system play important role in capital market. The 
financial reporting aims to provide the information 
that the investors need. Using the accounting data, 
the investors and users can predict the future func-
tion of corporate and use it for rating the corporate. 
Feltham et al. considered the conservatism in re-
porting the operational assets as one of the key fac-
tors of evaluating companies. Some researchers in-
vestigated the effect of conservatism on corporate 
value (e.g. Feltham et al., 1995). Guili et al showed 
that the loss is recognized earlier than the profit 
and unconditional conservatism has been increased 
(e.g. Guili et al., 2000). Conservatism as one of the 
accounting limiting principles has been used by the 
accountants for a long time and despite the criti-
cisms, it has retained its position. The conserva-
tism principle causes to select and apply methods 
among different methods in order to have the net 
profit and total assets of corporate increase. On the 
other hand, based on this principle, the corporate 
should not use the methods which manifest their 
revenues more and expenses and debts less than ex-
pected.  
Statement of the problem
Accordingly, conservatism means the differ-
ence in choosing policies and good and bad news. 
Good news means the positive stock return or the 
events which result in increasing the profit and bad 
news means the negative stock return which result 
in decreasing the profit. Thus, conservatism is de-
fined as the process of decreasing the profit and un-
derestimating the assets in response to the bad news 
and conversely, reducing the profit and overesti-
mating the assets response to the good news (Basu, 
1997, p. 50). One of the most fundamental issues in 
determination of corporate value is the structure of 
their ownership. The structure of ownership is a cri-
terion to assess the centralized ownership and also 
it is the collective ownership which is defined as the 
huge number of the shareholders. The sharehold-
ers are classified into different groups, one part of 
ownership is under the control of shareholders and 
legal entities, and this group relies on the financial 
statements at hand in order to supervise the func-
tion of managers of companies while other part of 
the ownership is in hands of the expert sharehold-
ers which in contrast to the first group, the internal 
information about the future viewpoints and the 
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commercial strategies and long term investments 
is obtained by connecting directly to the manag-
er of the company. The institutional shareholders 
are the individuals or the institutes which sell and 
buy the huge amount of the securities; such as the 
private and state banks, pension funds, insurance 
companies and the organization of welfare funds, 
the investment companies and the institutes which 
invest on the public companies. So, the institution-
al shareholders are the biggest shareholders of the 
public companies, these shareholders are potential 
to effect on the activities of the managers direct-
ly from the ownership and indirectly from dealing 
the stocks. Accordingly, the direct and indirect ef-
fect of the institutional shareholders is important. 
Understanding the relationship between the own-
ership and conservatism can be significant, too. As 
we know, the conservatism includes the sum of the 
accruals, operational accruals, and non- operation-
al accruals, so it is essential to investigate the re-
lationship between these elements and institution-
al ownership in order to consider the conservatism 
under the influence of the institutional ownership.  
Review of the Literature 
Rahmani et al in a research entitled” the rela-
tionship between the institutional ownership and 
liquidity in Iran”, investigated the relationship be-
tween the level of institutional ownership, concen-
trating on the institutional ownership by liquidi-
ty. In this research, for the variable of institutional 
ownership, both variables of level and ownership 
concentration were used. So, in this research, both 
theories of information or dealing efficiency and 
adverse selection were approved. From the method-
ological point of view, this research is one of the ma-
jor sources used(e.g. Rahmani et al, 2010 ). In this 
research, LaFond et al investigated the relationship 
between the informed and uninformed sharehold-
ers with regard to the informational asymmetry 
and finally they concluded that lack of informa-
tional asymmetry between the informed and unin-
formed shareholders leads to bringing the conser-
vatism in financial statements about,(e.g. LaFond 
et al, 2007) . Watts has experimented the conserva-
tism in accounting so that he explained the conser-
vatism in four frames including contractual, legal 
lawsuit, tax and accounting principles (FASB and 
SEC) explaining. The results of these investiga-
tions suggest the importance of these four explain-
ing. Watts states that there is a common property 
between these financial factors and that is called 
an “Asymmetric loss functions” (e.g. Watts, 2003) 
.Ball investigated the relationship between the con-
servatism and the profit- seeking motivations of 
managers resulting in the loss. In this research, the 
agency issues result from the lack of alignment in 
the interests of managers and shareholders. Ball 
mentioned that due to the tenure and limited in-
sights, and in order to get more bonuses by repre-
senting more profit, the managers seek to choose 
the projects having the negative net value and cause 
the loss for a long time (e.g. Ball, 2001). Ahmed et al 
suggest the relationship between the conservatism 
and corporate governance with regard to the com-
bination of Board of Managers, which on one hand, 
there is positive relationship between the number of 
foreign managers involving in the combination of 
Board of Managers and conservatism and on the 
other hand, this relationship is negative(e.g. Ahmed 
et al, 2005).Lara et al examined the relationship be-
tween the conditional accounting conservatism and 
the capital cost; the results of this study suggest a 
negative relationship between the conditional con-
servatism and capital cost. Finally, the results of 
this study approves that the conservatism leads to 
decreasing the informational asymmetry and capi-
tal cost. This research suggests that the less the lev-
el of conservatism is, the more will be the return 
as the shareholders expect (e.g. Lara et al, 2007) . 
Jennings et al have performed a research entitled 
“institutional ownership, information and liquidi-
ty”. What has been investigated specifically in this 
study is the relationship between the institution-
al ownership adverse selections in information-
al asymmetry. Generally, the results of this study 
showed that attending the institutional owners leads 
to reducing the informational asymmetry .Select-
ing the samples including 3576 American compa-
nies (1071 companies from NYSE,323 companies 
from AMEX and 2182 companies from NASDAQ) 
(e.g. Jennings et al ,2002).Jacoby et al investigated 
the relationship between the ownership dispersion 
(percentage of block shares in hand of sharehold-
ers) and stock liquidity. The results of their study 
suggest that more ownership dispersion leads to im-
proving the stock liquidity (e.g. Jacoby et al, 2010) . 
Calculating the price gap in October of 1984, 1988, 
and 1992, Kothare et al found the positive relation-
ship between the institutional ownership and price 
gap in marketing. They found that the dealings be-
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tween institutions are done by having the informa-
tional advantages in hand (e.g. Kothare et al,1995) 
. Results from the study of Bushee showed that the 
companies in which the percentage of institutional 
ownership is low, the managers tend to decrease the 
expenses of research and development and conse-
quently, raising the profit as the same level of last 
year. In companies which their percentage of insti-
tutional ownership is high, the motivation of man-
agers to manage the profit decreases due to the lack 
of investment on research and developmental ac-
tivities. So, we can conclude that attending the in-
stitutional ownership leads to decreasing the profit 
management and consequently conservative ac-
counting (e.g. Bushee ,1998) . Chi et al found that 
there is a positive relationship between the institu-
tional ownership and conservatism. Based on their 
findings, the companies with less institutional 
ownership have fewer demands for conservative ac-
counting. They also concluded that, there is more 
inclination to conservatism if the role of manag-
ing director and chairman of board of managers 
is not distinguished (e.g. Chi et al ,2007). Ajinkya 
et al suggest that the more percentage of institu-
tional ownership is the conservatism for prediction 
of profit increases. Based on their findings, the 
more percentage of the irresponsible managers is, 
the more conservative will be this prediction (e.g. 
Ajinkya et al , 2005).
Methodology
The aim of the present study was practical and 
the branch of quasi-experimental and it was ex post 
facto which was performed based on the real in-
formation of stock market and the financial state-
ments of companies approved in Stock Exchange. 
The Hypotheses of this research were developed 
by using the conservative theories of Basu and the 
models presented by Lara et al . The statistical pop-
ulation of the present study was all the companies 
approved in Tehran Stock Exchange during 2008-
2013 and the samples of this research were selected 
based on the criteria; first, they should be approved 
since 2008, second, they should not be included in 
the investment companies; third, their financial 
year ends at the end of Esfand (March). The in-
vestment companies and financial intermediation 
were excluded from the study. So, with regard to 
these limitations, 115 companies were selected as 
the statistical sample. For testing the hypotheses, 
the multivariate linear regression model was used 
and the required data were collected using the in-
formation of financial statements of samples and 
Rahavard Novin software. After calculating in Ex-
cel, SPSS20 was used to analyze the data.   
Research Hypotheses 
First hypothesis: There is positive and signifi-
cant relationship between the institutional owner-
ship and sum of the accruals.
Second hypothesis: There is positive and signif-
icant relationship between the institutional owner-
ship and sum of operational accruals.
Third hypothesis: There is positive and signifi-
cant relationship between the institutional owner-
ship and sum of non-operational accruals.
The variables of the research
Conservatism is a criterion for selecting the 
principles and processes of accounting in case of 
vagueness and uncertainty. In case of facing with 
uncertainty, the methods should be chosen and ap-
plied which lead to saving the least fortune of prof-
it. In fact, in case of uncertainty and dilemmas, the 
revenues and assets should be detected lately and 
the expenses and debts early. Choosing and apply-
ing these conservative methods is possible by means 
of accrual accounting. For instance, detecting the 
loss resulting from decreasing the inventory values 
effects just on the accruals and does not effect on 
the cash flows. Based on the above mentioned is-
sues, the non-operational accruals were used for 
assessing the conservatism. Non-operational ac-
cruals are used because the accrual accounting is a 
channel for conservative operations and on the oth-
er hand, authorizing on behalf of the managers, in 
case of uncertainty, paves the way for conservative 
operations. Using this criterion depend on the hy-
pothesis that is the level of uncertainty relating to 
the nonoperational accruals is more than the un-
certainty relating to the operational accruals. Sum 
of the accruals, operational accruals (working cap-
ital) and non- operational based on the model of 
Guili and Hyne (2000) is as following:
1) ACCit=NIit+DEPit-CFOit 
2) OACCit=ΔARit+ΔIit+ΔPEit- ΔAPit-ΔTPit)
3) NOACCit= ACCit- OACCit 
In above equation, the variables are:
ACC: Accruals; NI: Net Income before the un-
expected items; DEP: Depreciation; CFO: Cash flow 
Operations; ΔAR: Account receivable; OACC: Opera-
tional Accruals; ΔI: Inventory change; ΔPE: Prepay-
ment change; ΔAP: Account payable change; ΔTP: 
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Tax payable change; NOACC: nonoperational accruals 
While the operational accruals originate from the 
continuous activities of companies, the non-opera-
tional accruals include the increased expenses resulting 
from estimation changes, loss and gains of selling the 
assets and the loss from decreasing the values of fix as-
sets, incomes transferring to the incoming periods and 
capitalizing the expenses. Small amount of non-opera-
tional accruals suggest the high conservatism.   
Results
Investigating the normality of the variables
As the normality of variables leads to the nor-
mality of the residuals, it is essential to control its 
normality before fitting the model. To examine this 
hypothesis, Kolmogorov – Smirnov test was used. 
Based on this model, when P value is less than 5%, 
the null hypothesis is rejected in 95% CI.
Table 1. Kolmogorov – Smirnov test (K-S)
Model No. Mean SD Kolmogorov 
– Smirnov
P value Model
Accruals 684 45/10 84/1 099/1 178/0 Accruals 
Operational 
Accruals
684 69/10 048/2 479/1 125/0 Operational 
Accruals
Non-
 Operational 
Accruals
684 97/10 924/1 597/1 120/0 Non-
 Operational 
Accruals
Based on Table 1, as the P value for Accruals, 
Operational Accruals, and Non- Operational Ac-
cruals is more than 5 % (Sig > 0.05), so the null hy-
pothesis that is normality of variable is not rejected. 
First hypothesis: There is positive and signifi-
cant relationship between the institutional owner-
ship and sum of the accruals.
ACC i,t = β0 + β1 OWNER i,t + β2 SIZE i,t + β3 
CAPINT i,t +  β4 ETR i,t + β5 GROWTH i,t + β6 LE-
VERAGE i,t + β7 ROA i,t
OWNER
 i,t 
: Ownership of company i in year 
t whether it is institutional or not. So that for the 
companies with institutional ownership (more than 
50 % of stocks in a company), number 1 was dedi-
cated. 
SIZE
 i,t
 : Size of corporate i in year t which 
equals the natural logarithm of corporate assets.
CAPINT
 i,t
 : The investment intensity in com-
pany i for year t which is obtained from dividing the 
net fixed assets by the book value of assets at the end 
of period.
ETR
i,t 
: Effective tax rate in company i for year 
t which is obtained from dividing the tax price by 
operating profit
GROWTH
 i,t
 : Development of company i for 
year t which is obtained from the asset changes at 
the end of period compared to the beginning of pe-
riod. 
LEVERAGE
 i,t 
: The leverage of company i for 
year t which is obtained from diving sum of debt by 
sum of assets.
ROA
 i,t 
: Rate of return on asset in company i for 
year t which is obtained from dividing the net profit 
by the assets at the end of period. 
Table 2, shows the variance analysis between the 
institutional ownership and sum of accruals. Based 
on this output, the significance of regression model 
is approved. As the Sig is less than 5%, the hypoth-
esis about the linear relationship between these two 
variables is approved and the regression model is 
correct. Also P value for institutional ownership is 
0.332 which is more than 0.05, so the null hypoth-
esis is not rejected. In other words, the relationship 
between the accruals and institutional ownership is 
not significant. Among the control variables in this 
research, both variables of effective tax rate with P 
value 0.606 and company development with P value 
of 0.053 have no significant relationship with de-
pendent variable of accruals but other independent 
variables have significant relationship with accru-
als, so that the corporate size and rate of assets in 
return have significant relationship, but investment 
intensity and financial leverage has negative rela-
tionship. So the first hypothesis is rejected based on 
95%CI. The Durbin-Watson statistics is 1.976 and 
it shows that the errors are independent and there is 
no correlation between the errors and the hypoth-
esis related to the correlation between errors is re-
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jected and we can use the regression. The regression 
equation of the first hypothesis is as follows:
ACC 
i,t
 = -1/53+ 0/091OWNER 
i,t
 + 0/921 
SIZE 
i,t
 – 0/879CAPINT 
i,t
 + 0/597LEVERAGE 
i,t 
+ 0/694ROA 
i,t
The second hypothesis: There is significant re-
lationship between the institutional ownership and 
sum of operational accruals.  
OACC i,t = β0 + β1 OWNER i,t + β2 SIZE i,t + β3 
CAPINT i,t + β4 ETR i,t + β5 GROWTH i,t + β6 LEVER-
AGE i,t + β7 ROA i,t
P value Statistics t Coefficient Model 
0/000 -3/728 53/1- Constant
 coefficient 
0/322 0/922 091/0 Institutional
 ownership
0/000 30/470 921/0 Corporate size
0/000 -3/661 879/0- Investment
 intensity
0/606 0/516 128/0 Effective tax 
rate
0/053 -1/937 100/0- C o r p o r a t e 
development 
0/019 -2/345 597/0- Financial
 leverage
0/000 4/271 694/0 Rate of return 
on asset
150/983 Statistics F
0/000 P value
0/610 Coefficient
 determination
0/606 Adjusted
Coefficient
 determination
1/976 Durbin-
Watson
Table 2. The results of regression analysis be-
tween accruals and institutional ownership
Table 3 shows the variance analysis between the 
institutional ownership and sum of operational ac-
cruals. Based on this output, the significance of re-
gression model is approved. As the Sig is less than 
5%, the hypothesis about the linear relationship be-
tween these two variables is approved and the regres-
sion model is correct. Also P value for institutional 
ownership is 0.152 which is more than 0.05, so the 
null hypothesis is not rejected. In other words, the 
relationship between the operational accruals and in-
stitutional ownership is not significant. Among the 
control variables in this research, just the variable of 
effective tax rate has no significant relationship with 
operational accruals (because its P value was more 
than 0.05) but other control variables have significant 
relationship with sum of operational accruals, so the 
second hypothesis is rejected. The Durbin-Watson 
statistics is 2.036 and it shows that the errors are inde-
pendent and there is no correlation between the er-
rors and the hypothesis related to the correlation be-
tween errors is rejected and we can use the regression.
The regression equation of the second hypothesis 
is as follows:
 The third hypothesis: There is significant re-
lationship between the institutional ownership and 
sum of non-operational accruals. 
NOACC i,t = β0 + β1 OWNER i,t + β2 SIZE i,t + β3 
CAPINT i,t +  β4 ETR i,t + β5 GROWTH i,t + β6 LEVER-
AGE i,t + β7 ROA i,t
P value Statistics t Coef-
ficient  
Model
0/000 -4/469 192/2- Constant
 coefficient 
0/152 1/434 153/0 Institutional
 ownership
0/000 25/927 921/0 Corporate size
0/000 -3/942 103/1- Investment
 intensity
0/058 1/898 547/0 Effective tax rate
0/000 3/897 236/0 Corporate
 development 
0/037 2/088 635/0 Financial
 leverage
0/001 3/350 628/0 Rate of return 
on asset
129/826 Statistics F
0/000 P value
0/582 Coefficient
 determination
0/578 Adjusted
Coefficient
 determination
2/036 Durbin-Watson
Table 3. The results of regression analysis be-
tween the operational accruals and institutional 
ownership
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P value Statistics t Coefficient  Model
0/000 -3/772- -1/645- Constant coefficient 
0/338 0/959 0/091 Institutional ownership
0/000 29/762 930/0 Corporate size
0/034 -2/121 -0/526 Investment intensity
0/969 0/039 -0/010- Effective tax rate
0/004 2/911 0/155 Corporate development 
0/793 -0/262 -0/069 Financial leverage
0/000 5/459 0/916 Rate of return on asset
156/244 Statistics F
0/000 P value
0/618 Coefficient determination
0/614 Adjusted Coefficient
 determination
2/05 Durbin-Watson
Table 4. The results of regression analysis between the non-operational accruals and institutional 
ownership
Table 4 shows the variance analysis between the 
institutional ownership and sum of non-operational 
accruals. Based on this output, the significance of 
regression model is approved. As the Sig is less than 
5%, the hypothesis about the linear relationship be-
tween these two variables is approved and the regres-
sion model is correct. Also P value for institution-
al ownership is 0.338 which is more than 0.05, so 
the null hypothesis is not rejected. In other words, 
the relationship between the non-operational ac-
cruals and institutional ownership is not significant. 
Among the control variables in this research, the 
variables of effective tax rate and the financial lever-
age have no significant relationship with non-oper-
ational accruals but other control variables have sig-
nificant relationship with sum of non-operational 
accruals, so the second hypothesis is rejected. The 
Durbin-Watson statistics is 2.050 (based on Table 
4-12) and it shows that the errors are independent 
and there is no correlation between the errors and 
the hypothesis related to the correlation between er-
rors is rejected and we can use the regression.
The regression equation of the third hypothesis 
is as follows:
Conclusion  
Based on the hypotheses, it was predicted that 
the conservatism decreases by increasing the in-
stitutional ownership. What is concluded from the 
result of hypotheses test subjected to the relation-
ship between the independent variables and control 
variables and dependent variable in Tehran Stock 
Exchange during 2008-2013, is that accounting 
conservatism does not have significant relationship 
with the kind of ownership and other results from 
this study showed that among the control variables, 
there is not significant relationship between the ef-
fective tax rate and operational and non- operation-
al accruals. And there is no significant relationship 
between the financial leverage and operational and 
non- operational accruals, there is not significant 
relationship between the corporate development 
and accruals but there is significant relationship be-
tween other control variables and operational and 
non- operational accruals.
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